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Abstract 
This paper investigates the extent to which labour supply preferences are responsible for the marked rise in 
atypical work arrangements in the UK and US. By employing vignettes in a discrete job choice experiment 
in a representative survey, I estimate the distribution for preferences and willingness-to-pay over various 
job attributes. The list of attributes includes key distinguishing factors of typical and atypical work 
arrangements, such as security, work-related benefits, flexibility, autonomy and taxation implications. The 
results are indicative that the majority of the population prefer characteristics associated with traditional 
employee-employer relationships, and this preference holds even when analysing just the sub-sample of 
those in atypical work arrangements. Additionally, preferences across the UK and US are very similar, 
despite differences in labour market regulations. Rather than suggesting that labour supply preferences 
have contributed to the increase in atypical work arrangements, I find that the changing nature of work is 
likely to have significant negative welfare implications for many workers. 
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1 Introduction
A number of developed economies have experienced an increase in the proportion of
workers involved in atypical work arrangements (Boeri et al., 2018). These include,
though are not limited to, arrangements such as short and zero hours contracts, gig and
HIT (human intelligence task) work, and freelancing. In the United Kingdom, the pro-
portion in self-employment has risen by 25% over the past two decades, and as shown by
figure 1, this increase is entirely driven by those without employees1. The proportion of
workers on zero hour contracts (ZHCs)2 has increased from 200,000 to almost a million
over the same time period. The United States has experienced similar trends, with Katz
and Krueger (2019) finding almost a 20% rise in the proportion of workers engaged in
alternative work arrangements between 2005 and 2015.
Ceteris paribus, these shifts in work patterns are likely to have an impact on worker’s
welfare. Income and wages for atypical work arrangements are on average lower than
traditional employment relations in the UK, and ZHC workers experienced a greater
drop in wages and weaker recovery following the onset of the Great Recession (see fig-
ures 2a and2b). Similarly in the US, Katz and Krueger (2016) find that even after
conditioning on personal characteristics and occupation dummies workers in atypical
work arrangements have lower weekly earnings. Atypical work arrangements are addi-
tionally generally not afforded certain non-pecuniary benefits such as job security and
holiday and sick pay. However, they are more likely to enjoy other benefits such as
flexibility, autonomy and a favourable tax structure. This indicates two possible mech-
anisms, one where labour demand conditions for traditional employees are weak, thus
pushing workers into accepting more precarious working conditions with lower wages,
and another where workers are choosing to trade in pay and security for more flexible
and autonomous working arrangements. This paper investigates the extent to which the
1This encompasses freelancers, gig and HIT workers and crowd workers.
2ZHCs are an employment contract under which a worker is not guaranteed any hours and is only
paid for work carried out. For a full discussion of ZHCs see Datta et al. (2019)
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latter is responsible, and seeks to answer whether labour supply preferences for partic-
ular job attributes could be a causal factor in the evolution of the labour market.
Eliciting labour supply preferences is challenging. Realised choice data lacks detailed
information on both the chosen job and the available alternatives resulting in identifi-
cation issues. To overcome this I exploit the trade-off between typical and atypical job
attributes in a discrete job choice experiment using vignettes in a novel representative
survey. I estimate preferences and willingness-to-pay (WTP) distributions for a variety
of job attributes which often distinguish typical from atypical work arrangements. The
survey setting allows the collection of individual level characteristics including detailed
demographics and preferences such as risk aversion. This additional information in con-
junction with the distributional estimation allows for a careful treatment of individual
heterogeneity.
Using a mixed logit model I find that workers in both the UK and US value security
and traditional employment benefits such as holiday and sick pay far more than hours
and location flexibility, autonomy and tax perks. Estimates are very similar across the
two countries which is unexpected given differences in labour market institutions. While
a small proportion of workers place a substantial value on flexibility, an even smaller
proportion place a lower value on security. Thus, little evidence is found that backs
the hypothesis that worker preferences have contributed to the increase of atypical work
arrangements. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that approximately half of work-
ers in atypical roles would prefer more traditional work arrangements, and therefore
the changing nature of work may have important welfare implications. The results are
robust to a variety of specifications, unaffected by hypothetical bias, and little evidence
of inattention is found.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
the existing literature on the topic. Section 3 describes the survey design and data,
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and section 4 motivates and describes the vignette methodology used, with reference to
country specific labour market regulations. Section 5 outlines and develops the model
and empirical framework. Section 6 reports the results and compares them to a simple
calibrated model of search, and section 7 closes with some concluding remarks and
discusses policy implications.
Figure 1: UK Self Employment Proportions: 1975 -2018
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS)
(a) Employee vs Self-Employed Income: 2016 (b) UK Employee Wages, All vs ZHC: 2002 -2018
Figure 2: Atypical vs Typical Income and Wages
Source: Family Resource Survey and LFS
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2 Related Literature
Analysis of atypical work arrangements and their impacts to workers is not a new topic.
A branch of early literature from the 1990s characterised such arrangements as offering
lower wages with less security and benefits, and little scope for human capital accumu-
lation (Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; Beard and Edwards, 1995; Nollen, 1996; Kalleberg,
2000). However, even at that time the heterogeneity in the market was highlighted
(Bu¨chtemann and Quack, 1989).
The emergence of atypical work arrangements has been attributed to a variety of causes
including weak demand conditions, regulation, demographic changes, technological change
and preferences. In the early literature Cordova (1986) highlights the importance of the
slow down in economic growth that occurred in the 1980s, while more recently Katz
and Krueger (2017) find that US workers who experience unemployment spells are more
likely (7 to 17%) to be involved in a form of atypical work arrangement. Kalleberg
(2000) argues that technological improvements in information and communication sys-
tems additionally made it easier for firms to arrange temporary workers, and this is
further exemplified by the emergence of recent online “gig” platforms. Parts of the early
literature also highlight the importance of labour market regulation in driving increases
in atypical work (Lee, 1996; Capelli et al., 1997). Recent causal evidence from Datta
et al. (2019) confirm this as a contributing factor, finding that the introduction of the
National Living Wage (which represented a 7.5% increase in the wage floor) increased
care homes and domiciliary care agencies use of ZHCs.
A small body of recent literature exists that looks to estimate worker preferences over
job characteristics and fringe benefits, and it is these studies that this paper is most
comparable to. Mas and Pallais (2017) employ a discrete choice experiment during the
hiring period for a call centre in the US. They estimate the WTP distribution for flexi-
bility attributes for jobs, including flexibility of hours and work location, and find that
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hours flexibility is not valued by the majority of workers, though there is a long right tail
who are price inelastic for flexibility. Both Eriksson and Kristensen (2014) and Wiswall
and Zafar (2017) use a similar vignette method as used in this study. While a focus in
both papers is placed more so on preferences over job packages and other characteristics
such as bonuses and health insurance, some attributes of the atypical-typical trade-off
are considered, such as flexibility. Eriksson and Kristensen (2014) in particular find
that among five different job amenities (such as bonuses and on the job training) that
flexibility is the most valued.
This paper contributes to the above literature along a number of dimensions. Firstly, it
uses an experimental design which allows the distributions of preferences to be backed
out for arguably the most important distinguishing characteristics of typical and atyp-
ical work arrangements. This allows for a much fuller understanding of labour supply
decisions into atypical jobs. Secondly, as the experiment employs vignettes in a sur-
vey setting, it allows for other individual level preferences to be elicited, such as risk
aversion, as well as other individual level characteristics. As a result this offers itself to
deeper heterogeneity analysis. Finally, it uses representative samples of both the UK
and US population, and thus can be generalised to make inferences about the labour
supply decisions for workers in the UK and US, while also lending itself to make cross
country comparisons.
3 Survey Design and Data
Data was collected using an internet based survey launched in July 2018 on the Prolific
Academic platform, targeted at a panel of working-age UK and US respondents. The
Labour Choice Survey (LCS) was approximately 15 minutes long and contained ques-
tions on demographics, instruments for measuring preferences relating to risk and time,
a short cognitive ability test and a fictitious discrete job choice experiment based on
vignettes. Respondents were paid £4.55 ($5.81) for completing the survey, equivalent
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to £18.20 ($23.26) per hour. This rate is far higher than what is often paid on online
platforms3 and is equivalent to the 68th percentile of income in the UK and the 63th
in the US. This helps mitigate selection issues which could arise from a lower payment
rate, and improves sample representativeness. Prior to taking the survey to the field, a
small pilot survey was run on a different platform and respondents were asked to give
feedback concerning the clarity of the questions and no issues were raised.
3.1 Preferences
Two preference parameters which might be correlated with job choice decisions, and
in particular self-employment decisions, are risk aversion and time discounting. Self-
employment is often characterised by short-term contract work which offers less security
than traditional employment. It is thus hypothesised that individuals with lower levels
of risk aversion may be more likely to select into self-employment and therefore present
with lower WTP for job security characteristics. Additionally, newly formed companies
or sole traders can face a number of months or years as the business develops till they see
meaningful returns. The self-employed may therefore be represented more by individuals
with a lower discount factor.
In order to elicit preferences on both risk aversion and discounting I employ part of the
preference survey module from Falk et al. (2016). For both preferences a hypothetical
choice experiment is used which is analogous to the more commonly used revealed pref-
erence approach.
For both preferences the streamlined quantitative questions are used due to time restric-
tions, though as noted by Falk et al. (2016), this has a minimal impact on the explanatory
power of the module. For both risk and discounting, five interdependent hypothetical
3Hara et al. (2018) estimate the median hourly wage on Mechanical Turk is only $2 per hour.
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choice experiments are asked following a “staircase” procedure.4 Risk preferences are
elicited with a choice between a lottery and a sure payment, while discounting prefer-
ences are elicited with a choice between a payment today and a payment in 12 months.
Figures 5 and 6 in section A.1 present example quantitative questions for risk and dis-
counting preferences respectively.
3.2 Cognitive Ability Test
There appears no a priori reason why cognitive ability should be linked to labour choice
decisions, and estimates from the US indicates that there is no relationship between job
preferences and cognitive ability (Mas and Pallais, 2017). However, to test this on a UK
based sample I also include a short cognitive test.
I use a highly streamlined version of the Wonderlic Personnel Test. The full test consists
of 50 multiple choice questions to be answered in 12 minutes. Due to time constraints
I reduce this to 6 questions to be answered in 90 seconds. The questions cover logic,
maths and literacy, and are of varying difficulty in order to create separation of scores.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Representativeness of Sample
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics from the LCS, and where possible, the corre-
sponding statistics from the UK’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) and the US’s
Current Population Survey (CPS) in order to assess the representativeness of the re-
spondents.
There is an even spread of men and women in the survey5 as well as an even spread
across ages. In the UK (US) 67% (53%) are cohabiting with some form of partner and
4For illustrations of the staircases please see Appendix E and F in Falk et al. (2016).
5Seventeen respondents identified as transsexual or non-binary in total, all others identified as either
male or female.
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52% (41%) have children. All these figures line up relatively well with the QLFS and
CPS statistics, though our UK sample has marginally less people with children (to the
tune of 8 percentage points). Measures for the preference parameters are very similar
across the two countries. The samples are on average risk averse, requiring an £82.95
($89.06) certainty equivalent to induce indifference to a £300 ($300) 50/50 lottery, and
they discount the future at a rate of 0.66 (0.64) per year.
Respondents possess a variety of education levels and approximately 50% have an un-
dergraduate degree or higher in both countries. The education level proportions are
generally similar to the national data, though in the US the LCS survey has under-
sampled those with a lower level of education.
As everyone in the sample is by definition in some form of employment (respondents on
Prolific Academic are paid to respond to surveys) I restrict analysis in the national data
to only those who are active in the labour force. 69% (62%) of the LCS sample earn
the bulk of their earnings through a traditional employment relationship while the re-
maining 31% (38%) through self-employment channels, such as freelancing, gig work and
running a business. There is around 16 (28) percentage points more individuals who are
classified as self-employed in the LCS sample in comparison to the national data, though
this is unsurprising given the platform being used is likely to draw in more gig and HIT
workers. That said the mean employee hourly rate of £14.10 ($23.02) in the LCS is
almost identical to the national data. The mean hourly rate from self-employment is
very similar to the employment hourly rate though has a larger standard deviation in
both the US and UK. The gig hourly rates (£5.55 and $10.62) are considerably lower
however, and in the UK’s case, below the National Living Wage (£7.83).
Overall the LCS samples match the national data well, and based on the aforementioned
observables the LCS sample is generally representative of the entire population.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
UK US
LCS LCS QLFS QLFS LCS LCS CPS CPS
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Demographics
Female 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.50
Age 42.01 13.40 42.61 12.48 39.38 13.18 41.88 13.30
Married, cohabiting 0.67 0.47 0.71 0.46 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50
Has children 0.52 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.41 0.49
Preferences
Certainty Equivalent to 50/50 (£/$)300 lottery 82.96 47.79 89.06 53.18
Discount Factor 0.66 0.17 0.64 0.18
Education
Less Than High School 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.24
High School 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.09 0.29 0.27 0.44
Technical, Vocational, Some College 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.38 0.49 0.29 0.45
Batcherlor’s Degree or higher 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.38 0.48
Woderlic Test Score /6 (IQ) 1.55 1.27 1.68 1.33
Work
Employee 0.69 0.46 0.85 0.35 0.62 0.49 0.90 0.30
Self-employed 0.31 0.46 0.15 0.35 0.38 0.49 0.10 0.30
Employee Hourly Rate (£/$) 14.10 8.62 14.75 9.59 23.02 16.39 24.28 15.65
Self Employment Hourly Rate (£/$) 14.56 11.84 24.05 25.56
Gig Work Hourly Rate (£/$) 5.55 5.54 8.12 10.62
N 2,013 42,116 1,871 55,102
4 Vignettes
4.1 Motivation
The use of realised choice data to elicit preferences has a number of shortcomings. Firstly,
detailed job data (beyond wages) for a sample of the labour force is not easily available.
Secondly, even if the aforementioned data was available, it would not be possible to view
the alternatives within an individual’s choice set, and thus deducing a ranking would not
be possible. Finally, within this data there would undoubtedly be correlation between
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observable and unobservable job characteristics, thus biasing the results.6 In using an
experimental approach with vignettes these shortcomings can be overcome. By offering
respondents a repeated set of choices between jobs which have had specific attributes
manipulated so as to create a trade-off, preferences can be identified. Furthermore, by
making it explicit that the jobs only differ on the observables there is no possibility of
an omitted variable bias. By giving a respondent a set of six choice scenarios, a clearer
description of their individual preference ranking is revealed, and individual level fixed
effects can be controlled for. Finally, the use of vignettes allows one to mix character-
istics of atypical and typical work arrangements easily to disentangle preferences over
each attribute, which would otherwise not be possible.
The only drawback of using vignettes comes from the potential presence of a “hypothet-
ical bias”7 which has been widely noted in the contingent valuation literature (Loomis,
2011). However, I would argue that the contingent valuation approach is very different
to that used in this paper. The contingent valuation literature generally concerns public
goods and environmental valuations (e.g. oil spills); this is fundamentally different to the
question asked here, as markets for such goods do not actually exist (see Portney (1994)
and Loomis (2011)). Thus decision making and choices are likely to be highly arbitrary
for such problems. For the markets of interest here (i.e. labour markets), agents will
have taken previous consideration to their employment choices, as well as have real life
reference points. Indeed, Eriksson and Kristensen (2014) argue that relative valuations
between non-pecuniary job benefits should not be affected by a hypothetical bias. Fur-
thermore, this is supported by empirical evidence. Mas and Pallais (2017) run both a
field experiment in the employment process for a call centre, as well as a hypothetical
choice experiment in the Understanding America Study (UAS) survey, and find that the
results between the two approaches are very similar. They conclude that a well designed
survey-based choice experiment can elicit responses close to actual market choices, and
6For a formal derivation of this omitted variable bias see Wiswall and Zafar (2017).
7The biasing of estimates as the experiment is based on a hypothetical setting.
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that the survey has additional advantages as questions can be posed that would not be
appropriate in a job application. Nevertheless, as outlined in section 4.4 certain ex-ante
and ex-post measures are taken to mitigate any possible bias.
4.2 Attributes and Values
Jobs are described by seven attributes- wage, longevity, holiday and sick pay eligibility,
flexibility of work hours, flexibility to work from home, ability to choose tasks performed
on-the-job and tax implications. These characteristics have been chosen as they are likely
to reflect differences between traditional and atypical working arrangements. Though
they are unlikely to offer a complete description of typical versus atypical jobs, they were
chosen for their importance and tractability. Caussade et al. (2005) find that the more
attributes varied in a discrete choice setting, the greater the detriment to the ability to
choose. Therefore in each vignette only three of the characteristics are varied between
the two jobs and the remaining four are held constant so as to reduce cognitive burden.
Atypical jobs are often likely to be characterised by some job attributes which individu-
als may find preferable. The ability to choose hours and place of work are non-pecuniary
benefits which describe many atypical employment relationships. ZHCs, for example,
should in theory allow workers the opportunity to turn down work if they so wish.8
Similarly many online freelancing platforms function without any expectation of a self-
employed worker even meeting their clients, and thus working from home is common.
Additionally, self-employed workers are afforded far greater autonomy over the tasks they
perform. They have the ability to either turn down jobs or parts of jobs they do not
wish to perform, or even sub-contract them out. Finally, self-employed workers are able
to declare taxes through their yearly self-assessment in which they may deduct certain
expenses from their tax liability. These include work related travel, use of home as office
space, equipment, communication connections (e.g. internet and phone) and utility bills.
8It is questionable however, whether all ZHC roles afford workers this ability in practice (Wakeling,
2014).
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Conversely atypical jobs are often likely to be characterised by contractual obligations
that differ from the usual “permanent” employment relationship, this is certainly the
case with freelancing and other forms of self-employment. The longevity attribute thus
considers this, while also acting as a proxy for job security. Furthermore, atypical work
arrangements, in particular self-employment, offer no holiday or sick pay as is mandatory
in the UK in an employment role9. The trade-off between these benefits and costs is
what the vignettes attempts to exploit to estimate WTP for various attributes.
Table 2: Vignette Attributes and Values
Attribute Values
Wages £8.50, £10, £11.50, £13, £14.50, £16, £17.50
$12, $14.16, $16.33, $18.50, $20.66, $22.83, $25
Holiday & Sick Pay 28 days paid annual leave and 16 weeks paid occupa-
tional sick leave (or pro rata if part time),
No holiday pay and no sick pay
Longevity 1 month, 1 year, Permanent
Ability to choose hours Freely choose how many hours and when you work
them,
40 hours a week 9am-5pm
Ability to work from home Can work from home all the time,
Can work from home 50% of the time,
Can not work from home
Ability to choose which tasks
you do on the job
May freely decide which tasks are done on the job
relevant to the occupation
Must perform all tasks dictated by the company
Tax Implications Declare taxes as self-employed and thus can deduct
relevant expenses,
Taxed as a traditional employees and thus may not
deduct relevant expensese
Table 2 presents each job attribute and the various values which each attribute can take.
Hourly wages range from £8.50 ($12) to £17.50 ($25), in gaps of £1.50 ($2.16). The
option for holiday and sick pay is chosen as 28 days paid annual leave is mandatory in
9There are no similar federal mandatory rulings in the US, however more than half of employees do
get some coverage.
12
the UK and the median occupational sick pay in the UK is 16 weeks (Unison, 2017).
4.3 Job Attributes and Institutions in the US & UK Labour Markets
In order to get comparable results across the two countries the experiments for both
samples are identical aside from the currency and hourly wages as outlined in table 2.
It is important to note however that the institutional arrangements for some of these
attributes are different in the US than to the UK, and furthermore the interpretation of
some attribute values may be different.
Only around 34% of employment relationships in the US are afforded some type of “just
cause” protection in their contracts (Verkerke, 2009). This means the remaining 66% of
employees are subject to the “at-will” standard of employment law, where an employer
can dismiss an employee without notice, and without having to present a reason for
termination. This is fundamentally different to the UK where workers are protected
by statutory minimum notice periods, unfair dismissal legislation, and redundancy pay
rights. These rights are usually less binding in short fixed term contracts as they require
minimum work periods. As a result, a “Permanent” job in the UK is likely to have a
different interpretation to the same job in the US, and thus one would expect a lower
WTP for a permanent job in the US than the UK.
As mentioned above, full time workers in the UK must receive at least 28 days paid
annual leave per year (including public holidays), while in the US there is no statutory
minimum. Despite there being no legislative requirement, around 77% of American
employees do receive some paid leave, though survey data suggests that it is much less
than the UK, with the average private sector employee receiving only 16 days paid leave
per year (Ray et al., 2013). Similarly, in the UK workers are entitled to Statutory Sick
Pay (£92.05 per week) for up to 28 weeks paid by your employer, though survey data
suggests that three quarters are covered by occupational sick pay schemes. In the first
year of employment the median worker receives 16 weeks coverage, and this increases
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to a full years coverage after 5 years. In the US at a federal level there is no statutory
sick pay, though some states have passed legislation on paid sick leave. According to
the BLS the average private sector employee has 8 days of paid sick leave available to
them in their first year, while federal employees are eligible for 13 paid sick days per
year. Given the wide difference in the status quo of these two job attributes in the two
countries, this could induce some behavioural differences as per the endowment effect
(Kahneman et al., 1991).
4.4 The Questions
In order to personalise the question, the individual’s forename is inserted into the start
of the introductory text. Furthermore, respondents are advised that jobs are identical in
every possible way except for those characteristics highlighted in the vignette. As out-
lined above, this part of the question is key for identification and ensuring the analysis
is causal. Though hypothetical bias is unlikley to be an issue in this setting as already
discussed, two recommendations to address hypothetical bias are utilised. Firstly, Car-
son and Groves (2007) recommend that the survey design must have the potential to
affect future utility to ensure incentive compatibility. Indeed, there is evidence that
bias reduces in contingent valuation exercises where the probability of a real economic
commitment increase (Landry and List, 2007; Mitani and Flores, 2014). As a result the
question is framed so that respondents may “have their say” and that the results may
inform policy making in the future. Secondly, after each vignette a follow up question
asks the respondent for the certainty of their response on a scale of 0-100. Estimation
can then be performed on just those with high certainty levels (e.g. 70 and above).
A similar technique has previously been used in the contingent valuation literature for
public goods, where respondents responding affirmative for some sort of provision are
recoded as “no” if their certainty measure if less than a specific cutoff (Blumenschein
et al., 2008, 2001). Figures 8 and ?? in section A.1 show an example introduction and
question from the hypothetical discrete choice experiment.
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4.5 Choice of Vignettes
In each scenario the wage plus two other characteristics are varied across the two jobs
while the remaining characteristics are held constant. Assuming preferences over at-
tributes are independent, there are 3276 possible unique vignettes which could be pre-
sented. This number reduces to 468 if we consider vignettes with the same varied
non-wage characteristics and the same difference in wage (∆wage) across the two jobs as
duplicates.
106 vignettes were chosen by a randomisation program that had to fulfil a number of
requirements. In particular:
• Each attribute was given an equal number of occurrences of being varied, weighted
by the possible number of values that attribute could take.
• Of the six possible ∆wage’s, each should appear a minimum of 13 times in total
across the 106 vignettes.
• Each ∆wage should appear at least four times for each varied characteristic, ensur-
ing a full possible range of trade-offs for each attribute.
• No more than 15% (16) of vignettes should have responses which a priori appear
strictly dominated.
The chosen 106 vignettes were then grouped into 6 sets according to which attributes
were varied, and respondents were randomly presented with one of the vignettes from
each set.
5 Model and Empirical Framework
In this section I present the canonical random utility model used in discrete choice
settings, and apply it to the context of job choices and then show how WTP can be
calculated based off estimates of this model.
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5.1 The Canonical Random Utility Model and Mixed Logit Estimation
Let i = 1, ..., I index individuals, j = 1, ..., J jobs and a = 1, ..., A attributes. Individual
i maximizes utility from job j, Uij ∈ R with
Uij = ui(Xj) + ǫij (1)
where a job Xj is simply a vector of A attributes Xj = [Xj1, ..., XjA]. ui(Xj) repre-
sents the individual specific utility over the given job characteristics and ǫij ∈ R is an
individual-job specific error term.
An individual i chooses job j out of choice set J if it results in the highest possible
utility. Formally j is chosen if ∀ j′ 6= j ∈ J , Uij > Uij′ . ǫij is treated as random,
assuming linear sub utility we thus know that the probability individual i chooses job j is
Pij = Pr(ǫij′ − ǫij < (Xj −Xj′)
′βi) ∀j
′ 6= j ∈ J (2)
By imposing some assumption on the distribution on the individual-job specific error
term we get some of the most commonly used discrete choice models. In particular, if
we assume that ǫij is distributed i.i.d. Type I extreme value and restrict βi = β ∀i we
obtain the conditional logit model:
Pij =
exp(X ′jβ)∑
j∈J exp(X
′
j′β)
(3)
While the conditional logit model was a workhorse for estimation of discrete choice
models for a period it has two key limitations. Firstly, it assumes preferences are homo-
geneous across agents which is not ideal for investigating labour supply decisions across
a varied populace. Secondly the model presents with an independence of irrelevant
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alternatives (IIA) property:
Pij
Pik
=
exp(X ′jβ)/
∑
j′∈J exp(X
′
j′β)
exp(X ′kβ)/
∑
j′∈J exp(X
′
j′β)
=
exp(X ′jβ)
exp(X ′kβ)
(4)
which implies that any changes to the choice set J (except to jobs j and k) should have
no effect on the ratio of the probabilities of choosing job j or k. This would evidently
be problematic in a scenario of job choice where options in a choice set could grow or
change, with jobs which are highly substitutable for one another.
It is possible however to overcome both of these limitations. In particular, if we allow
heterogeneity in preferences (i.e. in βi), then conditional on a specific βi equation (3)
becomes:
Pij(βi) =
exp(X ′jβi)∑
j∈J exp(X
′
j′βi)
(5)
To back out the unconditional probability one simply integrates (6) over the distribution
of βi which, if we assume a parametric form, depends on some parameters θ:
Pij =
∫
exp(X ′jβi)∑
j∈J exp(X
′
j′βi)
f(β|θ)dβ (6)
and thus we allow decision makers to have different preferences, and the IIA property
no longer holds allowing general patterns of substitution between alternatives. This is
the mixed logit model from Revelt and Train (1998) and can be estimated via simulated
maximum likelihood.
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This model is highly useful for the setting being studied, in particular it does not impose
a representative agent requirement and allows for a distribution of preferences which
are not related to observable characteristics. Furthermore, it relaxes any assumptions
of income maximisation and allows agents’ utility to be driven by other non-pecuniary
benefits which are often important in job choice. Note that the above can also extend Xj
to Xji so that it contains not only job characteristics but also observable demographic
characteristics interacted with job characteristics. This would allow the estimated pa-
rameters of the distribution to vary across subsets of the population, which is highly
desirable for analysing job choice preferences. For example, it may be the case that the
sub sample of individuals with a lower level of personal assets may have a higher mean
preference for job security. Arguably the key limitation of this model is the require-
ment of specifying a distribution f for preferences β, typically a normal or lognormal
distribution is assumed.
5.2 Willingness To Pay
To simplify the interpretation of the βi estimates, and to further give them greater
economic meaning it is usual to transform the estimates into a WTP. This transformation
is relatively straight forward. If we take (1) and substitute in a linear sub utility function
we have:
Uij = βi0Xj0 + βi1Xj1 + ...+ βiAXjA + ǫij (7)
whereXj0 is the wage for job j and the remaining variables represent other job character-
istics. If the wage coefficient is fixed (i.e. not randomly distributed) and we differentiate
equation (7) and set it equal to zero we get:
dUij = β0dXj0 + βi1dXj1 + ...+ βiAdXjA + dǫij = 0 (8)
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Assuming that only the wage (Xj0) and another variable, e.g. job security (Xjs), vary
we have:
β0dXj0 = −βisdXjs ⇔
−βis
β0
=
dXj0
dXjs
|dUij=0 ⇔
WTPis = −
βis
β0
(9)
The interpretation of this is clear: the WTP of individual i for a change in job security
measures how much the wage must be changed to ensure that utility remains constant.
Such an interpretation is highly useful, as it effectively places a monetary value on dif-
ferent job characteristics and can thus be informative on job choice decision making.
As the coefficient to the wage variable is assumed fixed, this implies that a variable’s
WTP is distributed the same as the variables’s preference coefficient, though scaled by
the inverse of the wage coefficient. Furthermore, choosing to fix the wage coefficient is
convenient for two reasons. Firstly, if all coefficients are allowed to vary then, as noted
in Revelt and Train (1998), identification is difficult. Secondly, the ratio of two normally
distributed variables does not have well defined moments and the ratio of a normal and
log-normal distribution can result in a highly skewed WTP distribution.
One drawback of this approach however is the assumption that preferences over wages
do not vary in the population. While convenient, if this restriction doesn’t hold, then
variation in preferences to the wage may be incorrectly interpreted as a variation in WTP.
A possible workaround developed by Train and Weeks (2005) involves a redefining of the
model into what they call WTP space (in contrast to preference space). If we define the
WTP coefficient for variable s, γis =
βis
βi0
then equation (7) becomes:
Uij = βi0Xj0 + βi0γi1Xj1 + ...+ βi0γiAXjA + ǫij (10)
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Obviously equations (7) and (10) are equivalent, however the key difference is estimating
according to equation (10) will mean assuming a distribution for WTP rather than
preferences. Train and Weeks (2005) find that models estimated in preference space fit
the data better, but result in larger (and sometimes unrealistic) means and standard
deviations for the WTP distribution. Thus, while estimates in preference space will be
used as a baseline, as recommended by Hole and Kolstad (2012) estimates in WTP space
will be used for sensitivity analysis.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline Results
Columns 1 and 4 of table 3 presents the baseline estimates for the UK and US respec-
tively, of the mixed logit model discussed in section 5, where the wage parameter is
assumed fixed, and all other variables are assumed to be distributed normally. Parame-
ters associated with contract longevity (permanent and one year) are compared against
a baseline of one month, holiday and sick pay against no such benefits, flexible hours
against a standard 9am-5pm arrangement, ability to work from home (both 100% and
50% of the time) against a requirement of always working in the office, workplace auton-
omy against a baseline of a dictatorial set up, and being taxed as self-employed against
a traditional employee taxation arrangement. In both countries all mean estimates are
highly significant and positive aside from that for the attribute associated with being
taxed as self-employed, which is negative. For similar parameters, the estimates appear
sensible. In particular, the mean preference for a permanent contract is larger than that
for a one year contract, and the preference to work from home 100% of the time is larger
than the 50% counterpart.
The mean estimates are suggestive that individuals highly value security. Both per-
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manent and one year contracts compared to a baseline of one month have the highest
coefficients (2.88 and 1.92 respectively in the UK and 2.40 and 1.78 in the US), eligibil-
ity for holiday and sick pay follows second in the UK (1.89) though in the US is almost
identical to working from home 100% (1.596 and 1.623 respectively). Various forms of
flexibility are highly valued, though not to the same extent as security. Within the set
of flexibility parameters, working from home 100% of the time has the largest coefficient
(1.36 in the UK) while flexible hours and working from home 50% of the time have
similar mean preference estimates (0.76 and 0.88 respectively in the UK and 0.79 and
0.99 in the US). Workplace autonomy (through choosing tasks) remains valued though
relatively less so (0.574 in the UK and 0.561 in the US).
The only surprising mean estimate is that for declaring taxes as a self-employed worker
(-0.25 in the UK and -0.12 in the US), which given the ability to declare certain ex-
penses, one would expect to be positive. However the negative sign can be explained
by two possibilities. One is that a large number of respondents have not filled out self-
employed tax returns before, and thus have limited knowledge of the potential value.
A second possibility is that filling out self-employed tax returns can be cumbersome
and time consuming, and in some cases may require the help (and therefore expense)
of an accountant. This is especially the case when compared to the effortless PAYE
system that almost all employees experience. This in turn could mean that an attribute
of declaring taxes as self-employed may actually result in disutility at the mean. It is
useful to note however that 33% of individuals in the UK and 40% in the US do have a
positive valuation of self-employed taxation as demonstrated by figure 9 and table 5.
All estimates for the standard deviations are significantly different from zero except for
the work from home attribute, though it is significant at the 10% level for the 100% of
the time variation in the UK and significant at the 5% level for the 50% variation in the
US. This demonstrates the importance of allowing for a distribution in preferences for
job attributes, as there is evidently heterogeneity across the sample.
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Table 3: Mixed Logit Estimates
UK (£) US ($)
(1)
Preference
space
(2)
Preference space
(WTP)
(3)
WTP Space
(%)
(4)
Preference
Space
(5)
Preference Space
(WTP)
(6)
WTP Space
(%)
Mean
Wage 0.321*** 0.244***
(0.00988) (0.00746)
Permanent 2.881*** 8.99*** 55.4*** 2.401*** 9.84*** 44.1***
(0.115) (0.277) (1.73) (0.103) (0.330) (1.29)
One Year 1.916*** 5.98*** 37.7*** 1.780*** 7.30*** 32.0***
(0.0797) (0.197) (1.25) (0.0790) (0.254) (1.06)
Holiday & Sick Pay 1.890*** 5.90*** 35.2*** 1.596*** 6.54*** 27.3***
(0.0776) (0.189) (1.02) (0.0700) (0.230) (0.897)
Flexible Hours 0.763*** 2.38*** 14.9*** 0.789*** 3.23*** 14.2***
(0.0606) (0.177) (0.943) (0.0621) (0.236) (0.905)
Work Home- 100% 1.355*** 4.23*** 22.6*** 1.623*** 6.66*** 25.6***
(0.0707) (0.193) (1.16) (0.0777) (0.269) (1.17)
Work Home- 50% 0.883*** 2.75*** 14.0*** 0.985*** 4.04*** 14.3***
(0.0603) (0.177) (1.05) (0.0655) (0.245) (1.04)
Choose Tasks 0.574*** 1.79*** 11.2*** 0.561*** 2.30*** 10.7***
(0.0517) (0.154) (0.89) (0.0537) (0.212) (.860)
Self-Employed Tax -0.250*** -0.78*** -2.61*** -0.122** -0.50** -0.49
(0.0526) (0.164) (1.00) (0.0524) (0.215) (0.883)
SD
Permanent 1.525*** 4.76*** 22.2*** 1.424*** 5.84*** 20.9***
(0.148) (0.416) (3.33) (0.136) (0.503) (2.00)
One Year 0.701*** 2.19*** 14.3*** 0.672*** 2.76*** 13.3***
(0.154) (0.463) (3.14) (0.146) (0.574) (1.67)
Holiday & Sick Pay 1.009*** 3.15*** 16.6*** 0.838*** 3.43*** 10.1***
(0.133) (0.387) (2.62) (0.128) (0.492) (2.28)
Flexible Hours 1.037*** 3.23*** 11.6*** 1.036*** 4.25*** 13.5***
(0.116) (0.334) (2.79) (0.122) (0.464) (1.80)
Work Home- 100% 0.382* 1.19** 6.53* 0.309 1.26 7.45***
(0.197) (0.606) (3.52) (0.274) (1.12) (2.84)
Work Home- 50% 0.0273 0.09 2.83 0.340** 1.39** 4.27*
(0.158) (0.494) (2.55) (0.169) (0.680) (2.30)
Choose Tasks 0.441*** 1.38*** 9.14*** 0.359** 1.47** 5.95***
(0.167) (0.511) (2.04) (0.178) (0.719) (2.11)
Self-Employed Tax 0.561*** 1.75*** 8.61*** 0.485*** 1.99*** 8.57***
(0.161) (0.486) (2.88) (0.154) (0.613) (2.16)
N 24336 24336 24336 22652 22652 22652
Log-Likelihood -5870.39 -5771.21 -5448.46 -5359.42
AIC 11774.77 11578.42 10930.91 10754.84
BIC 11912.47 11724.22 11067.39 10899.35
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A striking feature of these results is the similarity in both ranking and effect size across
the two countries. The wage parameter is larger in the UK, which in turn means that
WTPs will be different, however this is unsurprising given the sterling to dollar exchange
rate10.
For a clearer interpretation of the aforementioned results, I additionally calculate the
relevant WTPs for each parameter, and these are located in columns 2 and 5 of table
3. These are simply the empirical counterparts to equation 9, and offer a very neat
meaning to the estimated results: for a change in a job characteristic, how much would
an individual need to pay (or be paid) to maintain the same level of utility. Columns 3
and 6 report the WTP reported in % terms of the wage rate, and is estimated in WTP
space. It is worth noting that the specification estimated in WTP space performs better
on all three measures of fit.
What is striking about these results is the value which agents place on parameters as-
sociated with job security in both countries. On average an individual in the UK (US)
is willing to give up approximately 55% (44.1%) of their hourly earnings to secure a
permanent contract or 37.7% (32.0%) for a one year contract, against a baseline of a
one month contract. As outlined in section 4.3, labour market regulation is very differ-
ent between the UK and US, and one would assume that a permanent contract would
be worth considerably more in the UK, and while that is somewhat true, a permanent
contract is still highly valued in the US. Given the size of the permanent estimate, there
was concern that the parameter could be picking up respondents expectations of career
development in jobs with permanent contracts, despite being instructed that jobs are
identical aside from the characteristics highlighted. This would obviously bias up the
results for the permanent contract. However, given the one year contract has a sizeable
WTP estimate as well, it appears unlikely this is the case. Though estimating a slightly
10The exchange rate was in the region of £1=$1.31 during the time of the survey
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different parameter, the results bear some similarity to Mas and Pallais (2017)’s finding
that workers would be willing to take a $6 per hour pay cut for a job that gave 40 hours
per week over one that only offered 20 hours per week.
Second to contract length, holiday and sick pay has the largest WTP at almost 35.2%
(27.3%) of hourly wages at the mean. Holiday pay entitlement in the UK gives workers
28 days paid annual leave per year (if full time), and a number of companies do not
deduct bank holidays from this amount. The NHS for example, the UK’s largest em-
ployer, gives in total 37 days paid holiday for staff tenured over 5 years. A back of the
envelope calculation using the estimate from column 2 in table 3 implies that someone
on an hourly rate of £15 an hour gains an additional £2.50 an hour from holiday pay.11
Thus such a high WTP for holiday and sick pay must mean that either agents place a
very high value on the insurance against sickness, or they systematically overestimate
the attribute’s value. If the latter of these issues is the case, as 69% of our UK sample
are employees and recipients of this benefit, we may be seeing a form of the endowment
effect within these estimates.12 Thus, as agents may interpret it as “giving up” holi-
day and sick pay, the estimate could actually be interpreted as a willingness to accept
(WTA), and the endowment effect could in turn be resulting in this over-valuation.13 A
similar anomaly could in fact be happening with the estimates for contract longevity if
a large portion of respondents are accustomed to longer contracts.
Holiday and sickness coverage in the US is on average less and this could explain why
the WTP estimate (when estimated in %) is around 25% lower in the US. That said,
the estimated WTP for holiday and sick pay in the US is still large. While an endow-
ment effect could be biasing up the results for the US sample, one would expect it to be
smaller than the UK as there is a smaller proportion of employees (7 percentage points
1137 days paid holiday per year equates to 7.4 working weeks and thus 45 weeks of remaining work.
7.4
45
≈ 16.5%. 16.5%∗ £15 ≈ £2.50.
12The endowment effect is the observation that agents place greater value on goods they own.
13In particular, the difference between the WTA and WTP would be equal to the bias induced by the
endowment effect. For a more complete description please refer to Kahneman et al. (1991).
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less) and, as discussed in section 4.3, both coverage and depth of this benefit is less.
One alternative explanation, aside from a high valuation of sickness insurance, is that
in the US there is no statutory law concerning unpaid leave from work aside for sickness
and caring responsibilities. Therefore the benefit of 28 days paid annual leave may be
valued not just for the paid leave, but also for the guarantee of time off work around
national holidays. However, without more information, it is difficult to conclusively say
what may be driving the surprisingly large estimates for holiday and sick pay.
WTP estimates for flexibility are also considerable. At the mean agents are willing to
give up around 22.6% (25.6%) of their hourly wage to be able to work from home, and
14.0% (14.3%) 50% of the time. Similarly at the mean agents are willing to give up
14.9% (14.2%) of their hourly wage to be able to choose their work hours. Workplace
autonomy appears to be valued slightly less, though is still significant at approximately
11.2% (10.7%) on average.
While analysis of the means is informative, one benefit of the methodology used is the
full picture offered of the distribution of WTPs. Figure 3 presents CDFs of WTPs esti-
mated in % terms for each attribute against their baseline state in both countries, with a
marker at the median. As one can see from the CDFs, WTPs for job attributes are very
similar across the two countries, and in fact for the job attributes where there are no
major institutional differences (i.e. flexible hours, choice of tasks and work from home)
the distributions look almost identical. In the cases of contract length and holiday and
sick pay, the distributions do show some difference, however the differences are generally
smaller than expected given the large regulatory differences across the two economies.
As already noted, aside from declaring taxes as self-employed, most attributes have a
very small proportion of individuals that would require a wage premia to induce indif-
ference. The permanent attribute while having a large mean, also has a large standard
deviation resulting in a wide distribution of WTP. One fifth of people would be willing to
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Figure 3: CDFs of WTPs, Estimated in WTP Space
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pay more than 70% in the UK, and 60% in the US, of their hourly wage for a permanent
rather than a one month contract. It is worthwhile to note that these WTPs have been
fitted to a normal distribution, and as the support is unbounded, the tails should be
treated with some caution.
There is a small proportion of individuals willing to pay highly for flexibility. In the UK
a fifth of individuals are willing to forgo 28% of their hourly wage or more, to be able to
work from home all the time and the equivalent figure for the US is 32%. In both the
US and the UK around a fifth of people are willing to pay 25% of their hourly wage for
flexible hours. These figures however, are still dwarfed by the WTP for security related
traditional employment attributes, even at the bottom end of the distribution. In the
UK only around 10% of individuals, and in the US only about 25% of individuals, would
be willing to forgo a permanent contract in exchange for avoiding a 30% pay reduction.
Overall, while there is clearly a small proportion of individuals willing to pay highly
for flexibility, autonomy and a self-employed tax structure, there are even less willing
to give up security. The evidence thus far is suggestive that preferences for flexibility,
autonomy and tax benefits are unlikely to be driving the changes in work patterns seen
in the aggregate data.
6.2 Contract Length and Theory
As discussed in section 6.1 respondents across both countries placed the largest value
on more secure jobs, as measured by contract length, and the estimates for these were
at first glance surprisingly high. In order to see how well the results align with theory,
I calibrate a simple search model to see how well the estimates line up.
Let δ be the seperation rate, λ the offer rate, r the interest rate, w the wage, z the un-
employment benefit, U the value of being unemployed and V the value of being employed.
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The value of being employed is
rV = w + δ(U − V ) (11)
and the value of being unemployed
rU = z + λ(V − U) (12)
With some manipulation and letting ρ = z
w
be the replacement ratio, r ≈ 0 and noting in
the steady state δ
λ+δ
= u where u is the unemployment rate, one can show the elasticity
of the wage to the seperation rate is
d lnw
d lnδ
= (1− ρ)u (13)
If one sets w = £14.10 which is the mean hourly wage in the UK sample, and assuming
35 weekly hours, the weekly income is £507.50. In the UK Jobseekers Allowance (un-
employment insurance) is equal to £73.10 per week, and thus ρ = 0.144. Furthermore
current data from the ONS states that u = 0.04.
Thus
d lnw
d lnδ
= 0.03424 (14)
If we assume time is monthly, then a one month contract implies δmonth = 1, and in
expectation a one year contract implies δyear = 0.083. Therefore, switching from a one
year to a one month contract implies an 11 times increase in δ, and by equation 14 this
would require a 37.4% increase in the wage. This calibrated figure aligns almost exactly
with the estimate from column 3 in table 3 for the one year contract, offering assurance
that the estimates are within a theoretically sensible range.
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6.3 Employees vs Self-Employed
It is unsurprising that at the mean individuals value attributes which are associated with
traditional working arrangements more so than flexibility, autonomy and tax benefits.
Until recently this was the arrangement for almost all workers in the UK economy, and
currently around 62% of the workforce are in full time employee-employer relationships.
In the US this figure is slightly higher at 67%. Two key questions in ascertaining whether
the rise in atypical work arrangements is predominantly demand or supply side driven
are:
• Do those in atypical work arrangements have different preferences to those in
traditional employment relationships?
• If they do, is this difference large enough to make them value atypical work more
than traditional working arrangements?
Before turning to a greater breakdown of heterogeneity I will seek to answer these two
questions. Table 6 in section A.2 presents an extension of the normally distributed model
estimated in WTP space,14 with interaction effects at the mean for those whose earnings
predominantly come from various forms of self-employment.15 For both countries all in-
teraction effects except those for holiday and sick pay and tax are statistically significant
and all are in the direction one would expect to see when workers sort into types of em-
ployment relationships based on their preferences. In particular, the self-employed have
a lower preference for security and higher preferences for flexibility, workplace autonomy
and self-employment tax structure. At the mean self-employed agents are willing to pay
£2.40 ($3.05) less per hour for a permanent contract than employees. Their WTP for
parameters generally associated with atypical work attributes is between £0.56 ($0.63)
to £2.12 ($3.20) higher than employees. It is noteworthy that even self-employed individ-
uals appear indifferent to being able to declare taxes as self-employed at the mean. This
14This is estimated in WTP space rather than preference space given the marginally better fit WTP
space estimates give, as detailed in section 6.5.
15The standard deviation of the distributions is assumed to remain constant between the employed
and self-employed for computational reasons, thus the interaction effect simply represents a shifting of
the distribution.
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suggests that filling out tax returns and maintaining sole-trader accounts is costly. These
results confirm the fact that those in atypical working relationships have a comparatively
greater preference for these working arrangements than those in traditional relationships.
Table 4: WTP Employed vs Self-Employed
Parameter WTP(£) WTP($)
All Employed Self-Employed All Employed Self-Employed
Typical
Permanent 8.97 9.69 7.29 9.92 11.13 8.09
OneYear 6.03 6.54 5.07 7.26 7.88 6.31
Holiday & Sick Pay 5.71 5.90 5.90 6.44 6.56 6.56
Atypical
Flexible Hours 2.26 2.05 3.12 3.06 2.08 5.17
Work Home-100% 3.56 3.02 5.14 5.87 5.95 8.15
Work Home-50% 2.18 1.87 2.94 3.26 3.07 4.24
Choose Tasks 1.57 1.40 2.28 2.20 1.79 2.58
Self-Employed Tax -0.53 -0.67 -0.11 -0.29 -0.55 -0.55
Typical 14.68 15.59 13.19 16.36 17.69 14.65
Atypical 6.86 5.80 10.43 10.84 8.26 15.35
For ease of exposition, table 4 presents the mean WTPs estimated in WTP space in
the US and UK for three samples: all respondents, the employed and the self-employed.
It is clear from these estimates that while self-employed individuals have comparatively
greater preferences for atypical employment, they still value security very highly. In the
UK the self-employed value a permanent contract more than any other attribute by a
sizeable margin (£1.39). In the US a permanent contract is the second most valued
attribute by the self-employed, with the ability to work from home all the time only
marginally more valued ($0.06). In both countries the self employed have a greater pref-
erence for both a one year contract and holiday and sick pay more so than any of the
atypical attributes excluding working from home 100%.
The last two rows of table 4 show a simple summation of the atypical and typical param-
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eters.16 Based on these job attributes it appears at the mean, that even self-employed
individuals prefer typical over atypical work arrangements in the UK. This is suggestive
that, for more than half of the self-employed in the UK,17 working in an atypical working
arrangement is not preferred to typical work, and thus their choice of work arrangement
is unlikely going to be supply-side driven. The proportion in the US is just below half but
still sizeable (47%). This implies that the increase in atypical jobs may have important
negative welfare implications for workers, and may represent a form of redistribution
from workers to firms. As the self-employed do have a comparatively greater preference
for atypical work, it may be the case that when presented with weak traditional employ-
ment opportunities, they are the first to sort into atypical work, though further work is
required to confirm this.
One caveat to this analysis is that it relies on the attributes used in the vignettes to
be the most valued by agents when considering job choices, and furthermore, that they
are representative of a specific working arrangement. Given the attribute values were
based on the statutory rules and average workplace arrangement in the UK this im-
plies this analysis may be more suited to the UK setting. The only other attribute
which may have a sizeable value and could be an important distinguishing factor of a
typical work arrangement is the opportunity for on the job training. This however is
likely to have a positive WTP (evidence from Eriksson and Kristensen (2014) confirms
this) and thus would further compound the valuation of a typical work arrangement
against an atypical one. There are obviously circumstances where traditional employees
may get more flexibility to work from home (for example computer programmers) and
there are circumstances where those who are self-employed may be relatively secure if
they have over time built up a base of regular customers. However, contract longevity,
holiday and sick pay, flexibility, autonomy and tax implications appear a priori to be
the most important distinguishing factors on average for different working arrangements.
16For the typical summation “one year” is excluded and for atypical “work home-50%” is excluded.
17The actual figure is 68%, which can be calculated by simply summing the 6 normally distributed
random variables, and looking at the share below £0.
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6.4 Additional Heterogeneity Analysis
Table 7 located in section A.2 presents the results of the mixed logit model estimated in
WTP space with the full set of interactions, so as to analyse heterogeneity at the mean
along a number of dimensions.18 Women in both the US and UK are found to have a
higher WTP for holiday and sick pay (£0.96 and $1.11), while in the UK they have a
stronger preference for contract security and in the US a weaker one. These results in
the UK indicate that women have a stronger preference for security in general, though
no similar conclusion can be drawn in the US. Women are also found to value hours
flexibility more so in the UK than their male counterparts, and this may go some way in
explaining why more women in the UK are in ZHC positions than men (approximately
3% of women have ZHCs while around 2.3% of men do).
Risk averse agents are identified by those whose certainty equivalent to the 50/50 £300
lottery is less than £150. Unsurprisingly, risk averse agents are seen to value security
more than their risk neutral and risk loving counterparts. On average risk averse agents
are willing to pay an extra £2.42 ($2.68) per hour for a permanent contract and £1.58
($2.26) for a one year contract. This is suggestive that less risk averse agents sort into
self-employment. Young individuals (defined by those whose age falls below the mean
age of the sample) value a permanent contract by around £1.23 more per hour in the
UK (though no significant difference in the US) and individuals with children place a
considerable amount more (£3.08 and $1.41) on a permanent contract, demonstrative
that a regular cash flow is highly important for these individuals. In the US both women
and those with children place a greater value on working from home all the time ($1.32
and $1.04 respectively). This suggests an interaction between these two may contribute
to the gender pay gap in the US.
18As before, interactions only shift the distribution, maintaining the same standard deviation.
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A question is asked in the survey concerning respondents’ ability to pay for an unex-
pected cost shock. Based on the response to this, a dummy variable was created to
mark individuals who would not be able to weather a £500 cost shock through either
self-insurance or informal insurance (e.g. borrowing from a family member). I find no
significant interaction effects for this marker, nor for those who scored above average on
the IQ test (aside from flexible hours in the US). Agents in the sample who are more
patient in the US, have a stronger preference for security while in the UK there is no dis-
cernible pattern, with patient agents preferring both security and flexibility attributes,
however the effect sizes are generally small.
6.5 Robustness
One drawback of assuming that preferences are normally distributed is that the distri-
bution spans from −∞ to +∞. This implies that some individuals will place a negative
value on some preferences which one would assume should always be positive, and that
a small proportion of individuals would have either implausibly high or low preferences
for certain attributes.
Analysis of the distributions for preference estimates in columns 1 and 4 of table 3 (see
figure 9 in section A.1) reveals even preferences which one would assume are strictly
preferred by all individuals (e.g. holiday and sick pay) have some share of people who
negatively value the parameter, as a result of the distribution which the parameters
are fitted to. Table 5 gives the proportion of preferences below zero when fitted to a
normal distribution. Aside from method of taxation, flexible hours and choosing tasks,
all preferences have a share below 0 of less than 5%. As a result, to test for sensitivity
to the chosen distribution, column 2 of tables 8 and 9 located in section A.2 presents
the natural logarithm of the coefficients when fitting all preferences with a share below
0 at less than 5%, to a log-normal distribution, and column 3 presents the transformed
results so they are comparable to the baseline specification, which is located in column 1.
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Table 5: Share of Preferences Below Zero
Parameter Share Below Zero (UK) Share Below Zero (US)
Permanent 2.94% 4.59%
One Year 0.31% 0.40%
Hoiday & Sick pay 3.05% 2.84%
Flexible Hours 23.08% 22.3%
Work Home-100% 0% 0%
Work Home- 50% 0% 0.19%
Choose Tasks 9.66% 5.91%
Self-Employed Tax 67.2% 59.9%
As can be seen, when comparing columns 1 and 3, there is little qualitative difference at
the mean and for the standard deviation between the normal and log-normal specifica-
tions.19 Additionally, the normal distribution performs better on both the Akaike and
Bayesian Information Criteria, as well as having a larger log-likelihood, thus fitting the
data better.
One drawback of fitting the preferences to a log-normal distribution is the resulting
thicker right hand tail. Figure 4 presents the distributions for the permanent preference
parameter when it is assumed to be normal and log-normal. As can be seen, the log-
normal distribution predicts a greater share of the population to be located in the right
hand side tail, at potentially implausible estimates (the mean WTP for the permanent
parameter is already very high as seen in section 6.1). Thus whether a normal or log-
normal distribution is assumed, the tails should be treated with caution.
19One would a priori assume flexible hours would dominate its 9am-5pm counterpart (and similarly
for workplace autonomy) unless some agents have a preference for a type of commitment device. Thus,
a specification was also estimated which imposed flexible hours and tasks to be distributed log-normally.
This caused little variation in the parameter estimates, except for flexible hours and tasks, which saw their
standard deviation increase by an implausibly high manner resulting in an absurdly thick right tail. It is
thus assumed that forcing those parameters to only be positive distributed results in a misspecification
issue.
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Figure 4: Normal vs Log-Normal Preference Distribution for Permanent
Column 4 of tables 8 and 9 presents the results for the specification which only includes
vignette responses where individuals give a follow up certainty score of 70 or higher. As
mentioned in section 4.4, if any hypothetical bias does exist, this may serve in reducing
it. As can be seen, all estimated mean coefficients increase in absolute size (the only ex-
ception is self-employed tax in the US) and similarly, the estimated standard deviations
are marginally larger for some parameters. The estimated standard deviations for a few
parameters become insignificant, this could point to a more concentrated distribution
for those with higher levels of certainty, however this could also be due to a loss of
power from the drop in sample size. It is important to note that the relative effect sizes
are not fundamentally different from the baseline specification. The relative effect sizes
(which are effectively WTPs) are more important for interpreting the estimates, and as
it stands, the preference ordering remains generally unchanged 20. This is demonstrated
in tables 10 and 11 which present the counterpart WTP estimates to tables 8 and 9,
20Ability to choose tasks increases to marginally preferred to flexible hours in the UK and holiday and
sick pay becomes marginally more preferred to work from home 100% in the US
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as well as additional columns estimated in WTP space rather than preference space in
terms of both currency and %.
The results estimated in WTP space rather than preference space are generally similar
to the baseline and have little qualitative difference, though notably the standard devi-
ation estimates are moderately smaller for the permanent contract and flexible hours in
both countries. Thus in line with what Train and Weeks (2005) find, the estimates in
WTP space are arguably more realistic (e.g. for permanent contracts), as the smaller
standard deviation makes extremely high WTP estimates less likely. Conversely to what
Train and Weeks (2005) find, the model in WTP space also performs better on all three
measures of fit.
It is clear from tables 10 and 11 there is little variation across specification, demonstrat-
ing the lack of sensitivity to distributional assumptions, certainty of responses and space
of estimation, thus offering strong credibility to the results.
One final aspect to consider is the issue of inattention biasing the results. Humans have
been found to be inattentive in a vast number of economic areas including calculating
tax, purchasing services, durable, and non-durable goods, and when making investment
decisions (Gabaix, 2017; DellaVigna, 2009). The setting of labour market decisions is
unlikely to be an exception, and this may be of particular concern given the hypothetical
setting of the experiment. To quantify the extent that the sample was inattentive two
seperate measures are calculated. Firstly, respondents were asked a simple attention
question part way through the survey.21 Secondly, of the 106 vignettes described in
section 4, 8 had strictly dominating options. In both the UK and US only 1% of the
sample answered the attention question incorrectly, and only 4% of responses chose a
strictly dominated job. Assuming inattentive respondents made a choice with equal
probability across jobs, this would mean that the inattention rate was 8%. This rate is
21“What is 20-13?”
36
low and unlikely to cause consequences for the interpretation of the results.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature concerning the rise in atypical work arrange-
ments, with a focus on the UK and the US, two economies which have seen a rise in
atypical work arrangements. A key question addressed is whether this rise is due to
labour supply preferences. By employing vignettes in a discrete job choice experiment
in a novel survey with a representative sample, I estimate worker preferences over var-
ious job attributes which are usually associated with either typical or atypical forms of
employment. Though the list of job attributes is not exhaustive, it contains arguably
the most important distinguishing factors for typical and atypical work arrangements.
Each job is described by a wage, security, entitlement to holiday and sick pay, hours and
location flexibility, autonomy and taxation implications.
Using a mixed logit model, I estimate the full distributions of the WTP for the afore-
mentioned preferences, and the results are robust to the fitted distribution, hypothetical
bias and space of estimation. The inattention rate is additionally found to be low, giving
the results strong credibility.
I find that attributes typically associated with traditional employee-employer relation-
ships are by far the most valued. At the mean individuals are willing to give up approxi-
mately 50% of their hourly wage for a permanent contract against a one month contract
in the UK and US, and a calibrated search model suggests the estimates align well with
theory. Given the differences in labour market regulation across the two economies, it is
surprising that a permanent contract in the US is worth almost as much as permanent
contract in the UK to the respondents. After contract length the second highest valued
job attribute in both countries is holiday and sick pay with WTPs of 35.2% and 27.3%
of ones hourly wage. Given the substantial estimates for both of these job attributes
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it is suggestive that some behavioural biases (such as the endowment effect) may be
resulting in an upward valuation, and estimates may be interpreted as a willingness to
accept (Kahneman et al., 1991). Mean hourly WTPs for location and hour flexibility
are substantial but considerably smaller (22.6% and 14.9% respectively in the UK and
25.6% and 14.2% in the US), and hourly WTP for autonomy is smaller still (11.2% in
the UK and 10.7% in the US). Analysis of the full distributions reveal that in the right
tail there is a small proportion of individuals willing to pay substantially for flexibility
and autonomy. However, there is an even smaller proportion of individuals in the left
hand tails willing to pay less for security and entitlement benefits. When measuring the
WTP in % change to wage, the distributions across the two economies look very similar,
in particular for the job attributes where there exists no legislative difference.
Heterogeneity analysis reveals that, at the mean, self-employed individuals have a com-
paratively greater preference for atypical job attributes in comparison to their employed
counterparts. This suggests that individuals do sort into types of work based on their
preferences. However, self-employed individuals still value attributes associated with
typical employee-employer relationships in general more than flexibility and autonomy.
Distributional analysis suggests that in the UK over 50% of self-employed individuals
would prefer to be in a typical work arrangement. In the US this figure is just less
than half, but as the holiday and sick pay attribute is aligned to the UK’s statutory
guidelines the analysis is not as suitable for the US setting. Given the omittance of an
opportunity for training attribute, which is generally associated with a traditional em-
ployment relationship, these figures should be seen as a lower bound. Thus, supply side
factors are unlikely going to be a key cause of the rise in atypical work arrangements,
and the increase is likely to have important welfare implications. Additional hetero-
geneity analysis presents suggestive evidence that the gender gap observed for those on
ZHCs in the UK may be partly due to a greater preference for hour flexibility by females.
The only attribute with a negative valuation is the ability to declare taxes as self-
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employed, which is surprising. Despite some arguments that the fiscal set up in the
UK may be driving labour supply choices, it appears that on average individuals prefer
being on the PAYE system. This finding also stands when looking only at self-employed
individuals who would likely have a better knowledge of the benefit of being able to
deduct expenses from one’s tax liability.
These results have important policy implications at both the government and firm level.
The growth of atypical work arrangements, such as self-employment and ZHCs, is un-
likely going to be driven by supply side factors. This study in fact suggests that, ceteris
paribus, worker’s will be on average suffering welfare losses if the proportion of atypical
primary jobs grows. Thus policy targeted to remediate some of the welfare losses experi-
enced by atypical workers would likely have high impact, and policies targeted by wage
level may be a coarse instrument given the size of the compensating wage differentials
for security.
In the UK, this gives credence to certain policy recommendations outlined in the govern-
ment commissioned report “Good work: the Taylor review of modern working practices”
(Taylor et al., 2017). In particular, policies aimed at securing workers in precarious em-
ployment relationships rights closer to employees, such as holiday and sick pay, would
likely give a welfare boost to these workers. However, it is vital analysis be performed
on the demand side to confirm this is the case. Given the results presented here, it
suggests the welfare boost to workers should far outweigh the cost to firms, but a true
welfare assessment would require a consideration of the firms elasticity for labour de-
mand. Other policies aimed at offering workers more security, such as the “right to
request” guaranteed hours, may also have positive welfare impacts, while also appreci-
ating the heterogeneity in preferences that has been revealed. Conversely, other policies
recommended in the Taylor review, especially those concerning tax alignment between
employees and self-employed should be considered more carefully. Individuals appear
to prefer being taxed through the PAYE system, thus forcing the self-employed to pay
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relatively higher tax rates than they currently face, while also having to fill tax returns
may be a step away from a fairer tax system.
US respondents to the experiment valued the UK statutory holiday pay, and median sick
pay almost as much as UK respondents, despite having no federal legislation on either
benefits. This suggests that in the US policies aimed at securing employees statutory
holiday and sick pay (similar to those in the UK), would be preferred by the majority
of workers. It would have large impacts on the 23% of US employees who do not receive
any voluntary paid leave, while almost doubling the number of paid holidays the average
employee gets. Given the general similarity of preferences across the UK and US, further
research concerning the welfare value of legislation concerning “just cause” protection
in the US would be also highly informative.
For the firm, these results suggest that the ability to work from home is a highly valued
compensating wage differential for many workers. Evidence from an experiment in China
suggests that working from home has positive productivity impacts on workers (Bloom
et al., 2014), and thus giving employees the option to work from home could represent
a win-win situation for firms and workers.
Given the results of this paper, research concerning the demand side of the story would
be highly valuable, in particular to enable a complete welfare analysis of some of the
aforementioned policies. Some analysis in this vein does exist (Datta et al. (2019)),
though it is limited to a specific policy response, concerning the UK’s National Living
Wage. If it is found that firms are benefiting from the rise in atypical work arrange-
ments, this could be indicative of a redistribution of welfare from workers to firms, and
representative of a weakening in the position for labour.
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Figure 5: Example Risk Question
Figure 6: Example Discounting Question
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Figure 7: Vignette Introduction
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Figure 8: Vignette Introduction
47
Figure 9: Distribution of Preferences
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A.2 Additional Tables
Table 6: WTP Heterogeneity by Working Arrangement
UK (£) US ($)
Mean
Permanent 9.69*** 11.13***
(0.313) (0.422)
One Year 6.54*** 7.88***
(0.214) (0.310)
Holiday & Sick Pay 5.90*** 6.56***
(0.196) (0.275)
Hours 2.05*** 2.08***
(0.199) (0.277)
Work Home-100% 3.02*** 4.95***
(0.215) (0.321)
Work Home-50% 1.87*** 3.07***
(0.199) (0.291)
Choose Tasks 1.40*** 1.79***
(0.174) (0.243)
Self-Employed Tax -0.67*** -0.55**
(0.188) (0.251)
Self-Employed*Permanent -2.40*** -3.05***
(0.452) (0.627)
Self-Employed*OneYear -1.47*** -1.57***
(0.375) (0.509)
Self-Employed*Holiday & Sick Pay -0.57 -0.14
(0.353) (0.452)
Self-Employed*Hours 1.07*** 3.09***
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(0.374) (0.465)
Self-Employed*Work Home-100% 2.12*** 3.20***
(0.402) (0.565)
Self-Employed*Work Home-50% 1.07*** 1.17**
(0.368) (0.477)
Self-Employed*Choose Tasks 0.88*** 0.79**
(0.325) (0.398)
Self-Employed*Self-Employed Tax 0.56* 0.63
(0.322) (0.412)
SD
Permanent 3.52*** 5.18***
(0.303) (0.463)
One Year 1.54*** 3.19***
(0.447) (0.434)
Holiday & Sick Pay 3.08*** 3.48***
(0.296) (0.375)
Hours 2.87*** 3.80***
(0.302) (0.437)
Work Home-100% 0.72 2.03***
(0.444) (0.573)
Work Home-50% 0.52 1.44***
(0.358) (0.482)
Choose Tasks 1.26*** 0.24
(0.343) (0.602)
Self-Employed Tax 0.53 1.45**
(0.544) (0.569)
N 24336 22652
Log-Likelihood -5748.55 -5329.71
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Table 7: Mixed Logit with Full Set of Interactions
WTP (£) WTP ($)
Mean
Permanent 5.264*** 7.961***
(0.784) (1.094)
OneYear 3.501*** 5.722***
(0.670) (0.905)
Holiday & Sick Pay 3.158*** 4.025***
(0.588) (0.737)
Flexible Hours 2.162*** 1.081
(0.655) (0.826)
Work Home-100% 3.438*** 3.503***
(0.661) (0.904)
Work Home-50% 1.883*** 3.561***
(0.593) (0.818)
Choose Tasks 1.502*** 1.081
(0.483) (0.687)
Self-Employed Tax 0.136 -0.334
(0.531) (0.743)
Female* Permanent 0.331 -1.057*
(0.443) (0.594)
OneYear 0.822** -1.485***
(0.352) (0.487)
Holiday & Sick Pay 0.960*** 1.113***
(0.329) (0.425)
Flexible Hours 0.822** 0.192
(0.334) (0.430)
Work Home-100% 0.370 1.039**
(0.333) (0.524)
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Work Home-50% 0.0758 -0.261
(0.320) (0.454)
Choose Tasks 0.0987 0.277
(0.281) (0.390)
Self-Employed Tax -0.813*** -0.0575
(0.291) (0.393)
Risk Averse * Permanent 2.421*** 2.676***
(0.650) (0.775)
OneYear 1.580*** 2.262***
(0.567) (0.684)
Holiday & Sick Pay 1.325*** 0.195
(0.474) (0.562)
Flexible Hours -0.463 1.350**
(0.578) (0.624)
Work Home-100% -0.885 0.564
(0.564) (0.686)
Work Home-50% 0.0640 -0.458
(0.480) (0.623)
Choose Tasks 0.225 0.865
(0.399) (0.540)
Self-Employed Tax -0.291 0.0637
(0.440) (0.567)
Young * Permanent 1.230** 0.220
(0.511) (0.656)
OneYear 0.435 0.371
(0.384) (0.544)
Holiday & Sick Pay 0.686** 1.011**
(0.348) (0.477)
Flexible Hours -0.495 -0.483
(0.348) (0.488)
Work Home-100% -0.109 -0.628
(0.357) (0.565)
Work Home-50% -0.205 -0.430
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(0.341) (0.491)
Choose Tasks -0.486 -0.292
(0.301) (0.425)
Self-Employed Tax 0.284 0.274
(0.297) (0.444)
Has Child * Permanent 3.083*** 1.414**
(0.495) (0.659)
OneYear 1.496*** 0.155
(0.398) (0.528)
Holiday & Sick Pay 0.326 1.056**
(0.341) (0.467)
Flexible Hours -0.412 -0.410
(0.355) (0.469)
Work Home-100% 0.0321 1.317**
(0.356) (0.563)
Work Home-50% 0.0529 0.767
(0.350) (0.482)
Choose Tasks -0.542* -0.0887
(0.296) (0.417)
Self-Employed Tax -0.374 -1.038**
(0.312) (0.432)
Self –Employed * Permanent -2.013*** -3.055***
(0.542) (0.605)
OneYear -1.538*** -1.442***
(0.373) (0.497)
Holiday & Sick Pay -0.411 0.0607
(0.343) (0.448)
Flexible Hours 0.908** 2.802***
(0.355) (0.463)
Work Home-100% 1.999*** 2.967***
(0.373) (0.545)
Work Home-50% 1.226*** 1.017**
(0.364) (0.481)
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Choose Tasks 0.456 0.763*
(0.333) (0.405)
Self-Employed Tax 0.796*** 0.535
(0.303) (0.404)
Self-insurance * Permanent -0.564 0.203
(0.472) (0.574)
OneYear -0.0402 -0.0753
(0.374) (0.477)
Holiday & Sick Pay 0.313 0.216
(0.348) (0.424)
Flexible Hours -0.254 -0.247
(0.351) (0.434)
Work Home-100% -0.574 0.558
(0.364) (0.524)
Work Home-50% -0.171 0.436
(0.349) (0.447)
Choose Tasks 0.0383 -0.0913
(0.288) (0.394)
Self-Employed Tax 0.377 -0.145
(0.309) (0.393)
Patient * Permanent 0.722 1.542***
(0.440) (0.571)
OneYear 0.751** 1.244***
(0.354) (0.482)
Holiday & Sick Pay 0.676** 0.673
(0.339) (0.421)
Flexible Hours 0.846** 0.215
(0.339) (0.431)
Work Home-100% 1.121*** -0.0792
(0.340) (0.519)
Work Home-50% 0.283 -0.355
(0.325) (0.453)
Choose Tasks 0.198 0.402
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(0.290) (0.398)
Self-Employed Tax -0.579** 0.624
(0.295) (0.397)
High IQ * Permanent -0.682 -0.827
(0.504) (0.644)
OneYear -0.296 -0.0547
(0.438) (0.529)
Holiday & Sick Pay 0.551 0.447
(0.386) (0.461)
Flexible Hours 0.235 1.166**
(0.396) (0.506)
Work Home-100% -0.605 0.212
(0.408) (0.581)
Work Home-50% -0.561 -0.159
(0.361) (0.495)
Choose Tasks 0.498 -0.197
(0.323) (0.431)
Self-Employed Tax -0.148 -0.611
(0.333) (0.440)
SD
Permanent 3.808*** 4.702***
(0.298) (0.436)
One Year 1.817*** 3.174***
(0.286) (0.357)
Holiday & Sick Pay 3.133*** 3.134***
(0.233) (0.388)
Flexible Hours 3.072*** 3.581***
(0.237) (0.362)
Work Home-100% 1.117*** 2.082***
(0.315) (0.606)
Work Home-50% 1.107*** 0.107
(0.273) (0.548)
Choose Tasks 0.985*** 0.803*
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(0.278) (0.467)
Self-Employed Tax 0.277 1.173**
(0.318) (0.555)
N 24336 22652
Log-Likelihood -5659.22 -5272.12
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Table 8: Mixed Logit Preference Estimates- UK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Normal LogNormal
Transformed
Log Normal
Normal-
Certainty≥70
Mean
Wage 0.321*** 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.395***
(0.00988) (0.00923) (0.00923) (0.0137)
Permanent 2.881*** 0.928*** 2.916*** 3.686***
(0.115) (0.0378) (0.140) (0.161)
OneYear 1.916*** 0.580*** 1.874*** 2.438***
(0.0797) (0.0430) (0.076) (0.108)
Holiday & Sick Pay 1.890*** 0.480*** 1.917*** 2.225***
(0.0776) 0.0444) (0.095) (0.104)
Flexible Hours 0.763*** 0.751*** 0.751*** 0.888***
(0.0606) (0.0595) (0.0595) (0.0765)
Work Home-100% 1.355*** 0.243*** 1.336*** 1.633***
(0.0707) (0.0692) (0.069) (0.0899)
Work Home-50% 0.883*** -0.137** 0.873*** 1.005***
(0.0603) (0.0678) (0.059) (0.0750)
Choose Tasks 0.574*** 0.566*** 0.566*** 0.728***
(0.0517) (0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0670)
Self-Employed Tax -0.250*** -0.245*** -0.245*** -0.341***
(0.0526) (0.0512) (0.0512) (0.0685)
SD
Permanent 1.525*** 0.534*** 1.674*** 1.739***
(0.148) (0.0599) (0.273) (0.177)
OneYear 0.701*** 0.310*** 0.595*** 0.477
(0.154) (0.0706) (0.1482) (0.326)
Holiday & Sick Pay 1.009*** 0.584*** 1.221*** 1.223***
(0.133) (0.0836) (0.247) (0.167)
Flexible Hours 1.037*** 0.997*** 0.997*** 1.182***
(0.116) (0.112) (0.112) (0.142)
Work Home-100% 0.382* 0.307* 0.4202 0.0562
(0.197) (0.181) (0.265) (0.235)
Work Home-50% 0.0273 0.0374 0.0327 0.0138
(0.158) (0.179) (0.156) (0.191)
Choose Tasks 0.441*** 0.448*** 0.448*** 0.540***
(0.167) (0.156) (0.156) (0.167)
Self-Employed Tax 0.561*** 0.473** 0.473** 0.692***
(0.161) (0.189) (0.189) (0.185)
N 24336 24336 18818
Log-Likelihood -5870.39 -5875.20 -3941.87
AIC 11774.77 11784.39 7917.747
BIC 11912.47 11922.08 8051.071
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Table 9: Mixed Logit Preference Estimates- US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Normal LogNormal
Transformed
Log Normal
Normal-
Certainty≥70
Mean
Wage 0.244*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 0.292***
(0.00746) (0.00703) (0.00703) (0.010)
Permanent 2.401*** 0.728*** 2.44*** 3.091***
(0.103) (0.0447) (0.122) (0.148)
One Year 1.780*** 0.492*** 1.750*** 2.249***
(0.0790) (0.0492) (0.078) (0.111)
Holiday & Sick Pay 1.596*** 0.316*** 1.623*** 1.923***
(0.0700) (0.0542) (0.082) (0.0953)
Flexible Hours 0.789*** 0.771*** 0.771*** 0.876***
(0.0621) (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0726)
Work Home-100% 1.623*** 0.436*** 1.622*** 1.892***
(0.0777) (0.0537) (0.078) (0.103)
Work Home-50% 0.985*** -0.0411 0.970*** 1.108***
(0.0655) (0.0726) (0.063) (0.0821)
Choose Tasks 0.561*** 0.552*** 0.552*** 0.690***
(0.0537) (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0649)
Self-Employed Tax -0.122** -0.129** -0.129** -0.0646
(0.0524) (0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0638)
SD
Permanent 1.424*** 0.576*** 1.533*** 1.826***
(0.136) (0.0662) (0.255) (0.172)
One Year 0.672*** 0.368*** 0.665*** 0.914***
(0.146) (0.0683) (0.1379) (0.175)
Holiday & Sick Pay 0.838*** 0.580*** 1.028*** 1.026***
(0.128) (0.0963) (0.231) (0.169)
Flexible Hours 1.036*** 1.024*** 1.024*** 0.891***
(0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.157)
Work Home-100% 0.309 0.308*** 0.5112*** 0.688***
(0.274) (0.0844) (0.150) (0.182)
Work Home-50% 0.340** 0.144 0.1404 0.346
(0.169) (0.280) (0.277) (0.234)
Choose Tasks 0.359** 0.401** 0.401** 0.148
(0.178) (0.161) (0.161) (0.335)
Self-Employed Tax 0.485*** 0.316 0.316 0.327
(0.154) (0.259) (0.259) (0.284)
N 22652 22652 18292
Log-Likelihood -5448.46 -5453.04 -3898.82
AIC 10930.91 10940.08 7831.64
BIC 11067.39 11076.55 7964.49
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Table 10: WTP Estimates UK
WTP (£/%)
Parameter Normal Log-Normal
Normal-
Certainty ≥70
Normal-
WTP Space
Normal-
WTP Space(%)
Mean
Permanent 8.99 9.31 9.34 8.97 55.4
One Year 5.98 5.99 6.18 6.03 37.7
Holiday & Sick Pay 5.90 6.12 5.64 5.71 35.2
Flexible Hours 2.38 2.40 2.25 2.26 14.9
Work Home-100% 4.23 4.27 4.14 3.56 22.6
Work Home-50% 2.75 2.79 2.55 2.18 14.0
Choose Tasks 1.79 1.80 1.84 1.57 11.2
Self-Employed Tax -0.78 -0.78 -0.86 -0.53 -2.61
SD
Permanent 4.76 5.35 4.40 3.65 22.2
One Year 2.19 1.90 1.21+ 1.99 14.3
Holiday & Sick Pay 3.15 3.90 3.10 2.68 16.6
Flexible Hours 3.23 3.19 2.99 1.98 11.6
Work Home-100% 1.19 0.98+ 0.14+ 1.38 6.53
Work Home-50% 0.09 + 0.12+ 0.03+ 0.86 2.83+
Choose Tasks 1.38 1.43 1.37 1.31 9.13
Self-Employed Tax 1.75 1.51 1.75 1.52 8.61
Information Criteria
Log-Likelihood -5870.39 -5875.20 -3941.87 -5792.42 -5771.21
AIC 11774.77 11784.39 7917.74 11620.85 11578.42
BIC 11912.47 11922.08 8051.07 11766.64 11724.22
All estimates marked with a + are insignificant at a 10% level. The remaining are all significant.
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Table 11: WTP Estimates US
WTP ($/%)
Parameter Normal Log-Normal
Normal-
Certainty ≥70
Normal-
WTP Space
Normal-
WTP Space(%)
Mean
Permanent 9.84 10.21 10.58 9.92 44.1
One Year 7.30 7.31 7.70 7.26 32.0
Holiday & Sick Pay 6.54 6.78 6.58 6.44 27.3
Flexible Hours 3.23 3.22 3.00 3.06 14.2
Work Home-100% 6.66 6.77 6.48 5.87 25.6
Work Home-50% 4.04 4.05 3.80 3.26 14.3
Choose Tasks 2.30 2.31 2.36 2.20 10.7
Self-Employed Tax -0.50 -0.54 -0.22+ -0.29+ -0.49+
SD
Permanent 5.84 6.40 6.25 5.25 20.9
One Year 2.76 2.78 3.13 3.10 13.3
Holiday & Sick Pay 3.43 4.29 3.51 3.62 10.1
Flexible Hours 4.25 4.28 3.05 3.14 13.5
Work Home-100% 1.26 2.13 2.36 1.60 7.45
Work Home-50% 1.39 0.59+ 1.18+ 0.98+ 4.27
Choose Tasks 1.47 1.67 0.51+ 1.51 5.95
Self-Employed Tax 1.99 1.32+ 1.12+ 2.20 8.57
Information Criteria
Log-Likelihood -5444.12 -5504.19 -3889.02 -5402.11 -5359.42
AIC 10922.23 11026.38 7812.03 10840.22 10754.84
BIC 11058.71 11098.63 7944.87 10984.72 10899.35
All estimates marked with a + are insignificant at a 10% level. The remaining are all significant.
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